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CONTRACTS - IS PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL FOREVER ES-
TOPPED IN NORTH CAROLINA? - Home Electric Co. of Le-
noir, Inc. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning Co.
INTRODUCTION
In a unanimous decision, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used in
construction bidding cases.' The court grounded its opinion upon
three reasons. First, the plaintiff's claim was not supported by law
because it failed to allege the existence of any consideration for the
defendant's promise. The law provides that a contract is enforcea-
ble only if supported by consideration.' Second, since North Caro-
lina courts have interpreted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
being independent of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, the "affirmative" use of promissory estoppel has been
denied.8 Third, the court stated that allowing a cause of action
based upon promissory estoppel in construction bidding cases
would create the potential for injustice.
This Note questions the North Carolina Court of Appeals de-
cision in Home Electric Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. Hall & Underdown
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. 5 This Note discusses sections 90
and 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and their cor-
responding comments and illustrations6 ; the North Carolina Su-
preme Court decision in Wachovia Bank and Trust v. Rubish7 ;
and the rationale of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Allen
M. Campbell Co. v. Virginia Metal Industries,' which allowed the
affirmative use of the promissory estoppel doctrine in a construc-
tion bidding case. This Note also examines the majority of other
jurisdictions that have allowed promissory estoppel causes of ac-
1. Home Electric Co. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning Co.,
86 N.C. App. 540, 358 S.E.2d 539, disc. rev. granted, 321 N.C. 297, 362 S.E.2d 781
(1987).
2. Id. at 542, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
3. Id. at 543, 358 S.E.2d at 541.
4. Id. at 545, 358 S.E.2d at 542.
5. 86 N.C. App. 540, 358 S.E.2d 539.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87(2), 90 (1979).
7. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
8. 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
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tion in construction bidding cases9 and discusses their sound and
logical reasoning.
THE CASE
Plaintiff Home Electric successfully bid on performing all the
electrical, heating, and air conditioning work on a rest home con-
struction project.'0 The company alleged in its complaint that,
before it submitted its prime bid, the defendant Hall affirmatively
promised that it would perform the duct work on the rest home
construction." Home Electric alleged that Hall orally bid $29,400
for the heating and air conditioning duct work. 12 Home Electric
allegedly relied on Hall's oral bid in submitting its prime bid.
Home Electric was awarded the contract, but Hall refused to do
the duct work."' Thus, Home Electric had to obtain the same ser-
vices from another subcontractor at a cost of $58,693.18.' This
amount was $29,293.18 more than the price quoted by Hall.' 5
Home Electric sued Hall for breach of contract. 6
Although Home Electric alleged that a contract existed be-
tween it and Hall, it failed to allege any consideration for the for-
mation of the contract.' 7 Instead, Home Electric used the doctrine
of promissory estoppel as a substitute for the necessary considera-
9. Allen M. Campbell Co., 708 F.2d 930; Montgomery Indus. Int'l v. Thomas
Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976); Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp.,
493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1974); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583,
374 S.W.2d 818 (1964); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'g Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d
95, 92 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1971); Norcross v. Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 821 (1962); Jaybe Constr. Co. v. Beco, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 406, 216 A.2d
208 (1965); S.N. Nielsen Co. v. National Heat & Power Co., 32 Ill. App. 3d 941,
337 N.E.2d 387 (1975); Lyon Metal Prods. v. Hagerman Constr. Corp., 181 Ind.
App. 336, 391 N.E.2d 1152 (1979); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet
Metal Works, 291 Minn. 113, 190 N.W.2d 71 (1971); E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M.
Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966); Wargo Builders, Inc.
v. Douglas L. Cox Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 26 Ohio App. 2d 1, 268 N.E.2d 597
(1971).
10. Home Electric Co., 86 N.C. App. at 540, 358 S.E.2d at 539-40.
11. Id. at 540-41, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
12. Id at 541, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 539.
17. Id. at 541-42, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
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tion.'8 This proved fatal. Hall moved to dismiss the case for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial
court granted its motion 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed the trial court's judgment, thereby reaffirm-
ing prior North Carolina case law that disapproved use of the
promissory estoppel doctrine.20
BACKGROUND
Before the Home Electric Co. case, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
"promissory estoppel" six times.21 The courts supposedly applied
this doctrine two times in defensive situations involving abandon-
ment of a legal right by a plaintiff.22
In 1949, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Clement
v. Clement,2s in which the plaintiff sued the defendant for recovery
of a balance allegedly due on three notes. 4 The defendant pled,
inter alia, that sometime after the execution of the notes the
plaintiff agreed not to charge any interest because the defendant's
bank had collapsed during the Depression. 25 The defendant alleged
that the plaintiff had waived his right to any interest on the notes
and therefore could not recover. The court found that the term
"waiver" covers every conceivable right, and it can have the nature
of either estoppel or contract.26 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the plaintiff's alleged waiver activated estoppel be-
cause the defendant did not detrimentally rely on it. 7 Conse-
quently, the court held that the plaintiff's waiver was contractual
in nature and as such, it required consideration.2 s
18. Id. at 542, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
19. Id. at 541, 358 S.E.2d at 540.
20. See notes 23-59 infra and accompanying text.
21. Id. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749
(1982); Sykes v. Belk, 278 N.C. 106, 179 S.E.2d 439 (1971); Clement v. Clement,
230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d 459 (1949); Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 78
N.C. App. 334, 337 S.E.2d 132 (1985); State v. Collins, 44 N.C. App. 141, 260
S.E.2d 650 (1979); Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698 (1976).
22. Wachovia, 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749; Clement, 230 N.C. 636, 55
S.E.2d 459.
23. 230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d 459.
24. Id. at 637, 55 S.E.2d at 459.
25. Id at 637, 55 S.E.2d at 459-60.
26. Id. at 639-40, 55 S.E.2d at 461.
27. Id. at 640, 55 S.E.2d at 461.
28. Id.
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In 1971, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Sykes v.
Belk.29 The plaintiff sued the Mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina,
and the City Council for alleged misrepresentation of a bond refer-
endum.30 The court curtly discussed the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel and decided the case based upon the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. The court held that the plaintiffs were not misled preju-
dicially because there was only a slight deviation from the pro-
posed purpose of the bonds.3'
In 1976, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided the case
of Tatum v. Brown.2 The plaintiff sued the defendant on the basis
of the defendant's alleged breach of an employment offer. 3 The
plaintiff, using the doctrine of promissory estoppel, alleged that
she detrimentally relied upon defendant's promise to employ her.3,
The court decided this case based upon the definition of "employ-
ment at will."' 5 When a contract of employment contains no provi-
sions regarding the duration or term of employment, or the means
by which it may be terminated, it is terminable at the will of either
party with or without cause.' 6 The plaintiff made no allegations
regarding the duration or means of termination of the employ-
ment, and she was not entitled to relief because defendant's offer
was for employment at will.' 7 The last sentence of the court's opin-
ion merely set out the court's agreement with the defendant that
promissory estoppel did not apply in this particular action.' 8
In 1979, the court of appeals decided State v. Collins.'9 In this
case, a criminal defendant appealed his conviction on the basis of
the district attorney's alleged breach of a plea agreement.40 The
court held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not availa-
ble to the defendant because he did not detrimentally rely on the
plea agreement, since he was informed before trial that the agree-
ment would not be honored.4 1 Based upon that information, he
29. 278 N.C. 106, 179 S.E.2d 439.
30. Id. at 111, 179 S.E.2d at 439.
31. Id. at 122, 179 S.E.2d at 449.
32. 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698.
33. Id. at 504, 224 S.E.2d at 698.
34. Id. at 504-05, 224 S.E.2d at 698-99.
35. Id. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 698-99.
36. Id. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 698.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 505, 224 S.E.2d at 699.
39. 44 N.C. App. 141, 260 S.E.2d 650.
40. Id. at 142, 260 S.E.2d at 652.
41. Id. at 145, 260 S.E.2d at 653.
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changed his plea to not guilty.2
In 1982, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the case
of Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Rubish."' In this case, the plaintiff
sued the defendant in a summary ejectment action to regain pos-
session of premises that the defendant possessed as lessee."' The
plaintiff lessor claimed that the defendant lessee did not give the
required written notice of intent to exercise his option to extend
the lease." The defendant answered that the plaintiff's predecessor
in interest had waived the written notice requirement.6 The court
held that:
The use of 'estoppel' as a ground for 'waiver' sometimes leads to
confusion as to exactly what must be proved by the party assert-
ing the estoppel. . . . In order to prove a waiver by estoppel de-
fendant need not prove all elements of an equitable estoppel, for
which proof of actual misrepresentation is essential; neither need
he prove consideration to support the waiver. Rather, he need
only prove an express or implied promise by Wachovia [or its
predecessor in interest] to waive the notice provision and defend-
ant's detrimental reliance on that promise.'
The court found that there was evidence from which the jury could
find that the plaintiff was estopped from demanding written notice
upon the theory of promissory estoppel."8 The plaintiff's predeces-
sor in interest had waived two breaches of the condition of written
notice, and the defendant had relied on the implied promise that
no written notice was thereafter required.49
Before the sixth promissory estoppel case arose in North Caro-
lina, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Allen M. Camp-
bell Co. v. Virginia Metal Industries." In this case, the plaintiff, a
general contractor, sued the defendant for refusing to perform in
accordance with its oral bid.5 1 The plaintiff had received an oral
bid from the defendant for metal doors in a construction project
and used that bid in forming its prime bid on the project. After the
42. Id. at 144, 260 S.E.2d at 652.
43. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
44. Id. at 418, 293 S.E.2d at 751.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 755-56.
48. Id. at 430-31, 293 S.E.2d at 757-58.
49. Id. at 429, 293 S.E.2d at 757.
50. 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 930.
1988]
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plaintiff was awarded the contract, the defendant refused to pro-
vide the doors.2 The plaintiff then had to purchase this material
from another supplier at a higher cost. 3 The plaintiff sued the de-
fendant based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.5 4 The de-
fendant alleged that the plaintiff did not promise to purchase the
defendant's metal doors if the plaintiff became the successful bid-
der for the prime contract. The defendant insisted, therefore, that
there was no contract between plaintiff and defendant. 5
The court stated that, although both parties at oral argument
assumed there was no direct authority on whether or not the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel applies in North Carolina, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Wachovia provided such authority. 56
The court interpreted the Wachovia decision to mean that promis-
sory estoppel, as described in section 90 of the Second Restate-
ment, applied in North Carolina because the Wachovia court used
the elements of section 90 to determine that the defendant had
proved that an implied promise existed and that he detrimentally
relied upon it.5 7 Relying upon the Wachovia decision, the Camp-
bell court held for the plaintiff, determining that promissory estop-
pel does apply in this state s.5  The Campbell court, however,
equated promissory estoppel with section 90, whereas North Caro-
lina courts do not. Herein lies the controversy.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals responded to the Camp-
bell decision in Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc.5 9 In Lee,
the implicit question was whether North Carolina applied the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel as described in section 90. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals answered the question yes. The plain-
tiff, as a third-party beneficiary, sued the defendant for the breach
of a contract that the defendant made with a third party. 0 This
contract provided that the defendant would make payments to the
52. Id. at 931.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 934.
59. 78 N.C. App. 334, 337 S.E.2d 132.
60. The plaintiff asserted a third-party beneficiary claim under the doctrine
of promissory estoppel which does allow a third party, not the promisee, to assert
promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 and corresponding comments and illustrations.
298 [Vol. 10:293
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plaintiff, thereby repaying plaintiff for a loan made to the third
party.6 In denying the plaintiff's cause of action under the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel, the court stated that although section
90 had never been denominated as the "doctrine of promissory es-
toppel," it was an influential rule.62 The court stated, however,
that, North Carolina courts recognized and applied the doctrine of
promissory estoppel only in cases involving waiver by a promisee.63
Recognizing that section 90 allows a third person to assert
promissory estoppel, this court refused to do so because "under the
current state of the law [in North Carolina] only the promisee may
assert promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration. '64
This assertion is what makes the Lee opinion so remarkable. It
flies in the face of the statement by the Home Electric Co. court
that such recognition of promissory estoppel has never been made
by North Carolina courts.65 What is more profound is that the Lee
and Home Electric Co. decisions were decided by the same
court-the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
Finally, in 1987, the North Carolina Court of Appeals heard
the case of Home Electric Co.6" The court's unanimous decision in
this case may forever "estop" the use of promissory estoppel. The
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has allowed the plain-
tiff's petition for discretionary review. It is now up to the supreme
court to try to make sense out of a very confused area of law.
ANALYSIS
The majority of jurisdictions that allow a promissory estoppel
cause of action cite to section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts as presenting the necessary elements to establish prom-
issory estoppel.67 The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Home
Electric Co. recognized this interpretation of section 90 but
pointed out differing interpretations of this particular section:
It [§ 901 appears to be intended as a substantive rule of law to be
used as a sword under which a promisee can bring an action and,
61. Lee, 78 N.C. App. at 335, 337 S.E.2d at 133.
62. Id. at 338-39, 337 S.E.2d at 135.
63. Id. at 340, 337 S.E.2d at 136.
64. Id. citing Clement, 230 N.C. at 640, 55 S.E.2d at 461.
65. Home Electric Co., 86 N.C. App. at 543, 358 S.E.2d at 541.
66. Id. at 540, 358 S.E.2d at 539.
67. Annotation, Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of Statute of
Frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1046 (1974).
19881 299
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if he proves the elements set out in § 90, enforce the promise. By
supplying the missing elements to the contract it appears to give
the promisee an enforceable right of action in contract against his
promisor. In effect, if a complaint is patterned after § 90 it antici-
pates the defenses of lack of assent and lack of consideration, and
thus precludes, at least as a matter of law, the promisor's reliance
on such defenses. . . .Apparently not all legal scholars equate
promissory estoppel with § 90 of the Restatement. The position
has been taken that promissory estoppel applies only in cases
where there is a promise or representation as to an intended
abandonment by the promisor of a legal right which he holds or
will hold against the promisee."
The Home Electric Co. court endorsed the second interpretation
based on prior North Carolina case law, which does not equate
promissory estoppel of section 90 with the submitted exceptions of
Wachovia and Lee."" The Home Electric Co. court also looked at
Clement,70 Wachovia,7 1 and Campbell72 in seeking to justify its al-
legiance to a separate and independent doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
The court stated that Clement, which involved a waiver of a
legal right, was properly decided because promissory estoppel,
though generally applicable in waiver situations, cannot be applied
in two situations: first, where there is a waiver of interest on a loan
and, second, when there is no detrimental reliance by the promisee
in that case. 73 The Home Electric Co. court noted that, in Wacho-
68. 86 N.C. App. at 542-43, 358 S.E.2d at 541.
69. Home Electric Co. reinforced prior North Carolina decisions which have
held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel in North Carolina is allowed only in
"waiver" cases. It is submitted, however, that "waiver" cases involve the applica-
tion of a "waiver by estoppel" doctrine, not the promissory estoppel doctrine.
While a "waiver" can always be retracted, a promise that has induced detrimental
reliance cannot.
The Wachovia case was really an "waiver by estoppel" case, but it is well
known as a promissory estoppel case because in holding for the defendant it used
the elements of promissory estoppel under § 90. North Carolina courts supposedly
never do this. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
The Lee case involved a promissory estoppel cause of action. Although the
court denied the right of action to the plaintiff because he was a third-party bene-
ficiary, the court asserted, as a rationale, that only a promisee can use promissory
estoppel as a substitute for consideration. This rationale alone is profound.
70. 230 N.C. 636, 55 S.E.2d 459.
71. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749.
72. 708 F.2d 930.
73. Home Electric Co., 86 N.C. App. at 543, 358 S.E.2d at 541.
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via, section 90 was never mentioned per se and that it was the
defendant in Wachovia who attempted to use promissory estoppel
as a defense."" Possibly, however, the court missed the significance
of Wachovia. Although the words "section 90" were never explic-
itly mentioned, the Wachovia court applied that section's ele-
ments, albeit in a waiver situation.7 5 The significance of the Wa-
chovia decision can be interpreted - and properly so - to mean
that section 90 has finally been equated with the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel. Consequently, the full intended application - de-
fensive and affirmative usage - of promissory estoppel must be
recognized. Indeed, in Campbell, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
Wachovia to mean exactly that.8
Unfortunately, the Home Electric Co. court found that the
Campbell court misinterpreted Wachovia because Wachovia did
not explicitly assert that promissory estoppel could be applied in
an affirmative manner." The court also found that, in Clement
and Wachovia, the parties were only trying to modify an existing
contract, whereas in Campbell and Home Electric Co., the parties
sought to create a contract by using promissory estoppel. 7s The
court deemed this a significant distinction because North Carolina
courts have never allowed promissory estoppel to be used as a sub-
stitute for the necessary contractual element of consideration.79
However, since promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy ac-
cepted under contract law, in particular situations equity requires
the use of promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration.
Section 90 sets forth the doctrine of promissory estoppel as
follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third per-
son and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding
if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.80
As one author noted, "[N]othing in the above language of § 90 lim-
74. Id. at 544, 358 S.E.2d at 541.
75. Wachovia, 306 N.C. at 425-26, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
76. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 933.
77. Home Electric Co., 86 N.C. App. at 544, 358 S.E.2d at 542.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 69, discussing the assertion made by the Lee court.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
1988] 301
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its its application to defensive situations whereby the promisor
seeks to assert a legal right which he promised to abandon."8 Fur-
thermore, in the previous six "promissory estoppel" cases heard by
North Carolina courts, the courts never specifically limited the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.2 Section 90
makes explicit referrals to the affirmative use of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, and the Wachovia and Campbell courts dis-
played a willingness to allow someone the opportunity to try prov-
ing the elements of a promissory estoppel. In light of this, no
longer does any valid justification for denying a promissory estop-
pel cause of action in North Carolina exist. It is time for the North
Carolina courts to equate promissory estoppel with section 90.
The facts of Home Electric Co. concerned construction bid-
ding."' The construction industry desperately needs uniformity in
81. See Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' Liability in Construc-
tion Bidding Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 387, 391 (1985). Also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 90 provides in its comments "a" and "b" the following illustra-
tions which show the application of promissory estoppel:
Comment a, illustration 1 states:
1. A, knowing that B is going to college, promises B that A will give him
$5,000 on completion of his course. B goes to college, and borrows and
spends more than $5000 for college expenses. When he has nearly com-
pleted his course, A notifies him of an intention to revoke the promise.
A's promise is binding and B is entitled to payment on completion of the
course without regard to whether his performance was 'bargained for'
under § 71.
Comment b, illustrations 2-4 state:
2. A promises B not to foreclose, for a specified time, a mortgage which A
holds on B's land. B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's
promise is binding and may be enforced by denial of foreclosure before
the time has elapsed.
3. A sues B in a municipal court for damages for personal injuries caused
by B's negligence. After the one year statute of limitations has run, B
requests A to discontinue the action and start again in the superior court
where the action can be consolidated with other actions against B arising
out of the same accident. A does so. B's implied promise that no harm to
A will result bars B from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.
4. A has been employed by B for 40 years. B promises to pay A a pension
of $200 per month when A retires. A retires and forbears to work else-
where for several years while B pays the pension. B's promise is binding.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
82. See supra notes 23-59 and accompanying text.
83. For detailed information on the problems of construction bidding, see
Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construc-
tion Industry, 19 U. CHi. L. REV. 237 (1952); Note, supra note 81; Note, Once
Around the Flag Pole: Construction Bidding and Contracts to Formation, 39
[Vol. 10:293
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the law of construction bidding.84 However, courts hearing this
type of case are of two different camps.85 Unfortunately, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, in hearing this case of first impression,
decided to follow the minority of jurisdictions that consider a sub-
bid as merely an offer to enter a bilateral contract that can be
withdrawn without liability any time before formal acceptance.86
Construction bidding is a bargained transaction, and, thus, the
courts in the minority refuse to allow the assertion of promissory
estoppel. 7 Today, however, "the principal application of the doc-
trine [of promissory estoppel] is no longer in the limited area of
gratuitous promises but is in the much broader field of bargain
transactions."8 8
Nevertheless, the courts in the minority rely on a 1933 deci-
sion, James C. Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.,89 which was ultimately
decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit. Judge Learned Hand, in writing the Baird decision, reasoned
that the subcontractor, by submitting his sub-bid, is attempting to
bargain for the general contractor's promise that the subcontractor
will be awarded the subcontract if his bid is low." Therefore, since
neither action by the offeree nor receipt of money is bargained for,
the offer is revocable until the offeree accepts it."' In Baird, the
court denied the plaintiff a remedy based on the traditional rules
of offer and acceptance. 2 The plaintiff asked the court to hold the
N.Y.U. L. REV. 816 (1964); Comment, Construction Bidding Problem: Is There A
Solution Fair to Both the General Contractor and Subcontractor?, 19 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 552 (1975); Note, "Firm Offer" Problems in Construction Bids and the
Need for Promissory Estoppel, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 212 (1969);
84. See generally Comment, supra note 83.
85. The majority of jurisdictions allow recovery on the basis of Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958), and section 87(2) of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979). The minority of jurisdictions deny
recovery on the basis of James C. Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1933), and refuse to apply sections 90 and 87(2) of the Restatement (1979).
86. Baird Co., 64 F.2d 344; Mitchell v. Siqueiros, 99 Idaho 396, 582 P.2d 1074
(1978); K.L. House Constr. Co. v. Watson, 84 N.M. 783, 508 P.2d 592 (1973);
Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erikson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 418 P.2d 187 (1966).
87. Id.
88. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78
YALE L.J. 343, 344 (1969).
89. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
90. Id. at 345-46.
91. Id. at 346.
92. For a more detailed discussion on the traditional rules of offer and ac-
ceptance and how they apply to construction bidding cases, see Comment, supra
19881
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defendant liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel because
he had revoked his offer after the plaintiff detrimentally relied on
it. 8 Judge Hand, however, rejected the applicability of promissory
estoppel to bargain transactions."4
Despite the eminence of Judge Learned Hand, the Baird deci-
sion has been greatly criticized over the years.9 5 The majority of
jurisdictions hearing construction bidding cases recognize the pre-
carious position of the general contractor when the subcontractor,
whose bid has been used in figuring the prime bid refuses to per-
form at the price he originally offered.96 Therefore, these courts
began using the doctrine of promissory estoppel to protect the gen-
eral contractor. The leading case applying this doctrine is Drennan
v. Star Paving Co. 97 The facts of Drennan are very similar to the
facts of Home Electric Co.98 The Drennan court decided that the
use of a bid is not acceptance. 9 Thus, the court held that the
plaintiff could not win under the traditional rules of offer and ac-
ceptance. 100 However, unlike the Baird court, the Drennan court
allowed recovery based on promissory estoppel. 101
In Drennan, the court determined that the subcontractor
note 83, at 552.
93. Baird Co., 64 F.2d at 346.
94. Id.
95. See Comment, supra note 83, at 552.
96. The general contractor is bound to the prime contract. As such, should a
subcontractor renege on its offer, the general contractor must obtain the same
services/goods from another supplier at, more than likely, a higher cost, which will
come directly from any profit the general contractor initially hoped to obtain.
97. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
98. In both cases, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant
who had refused to perform according to its oral bid.
99. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d at 413, 333 P.2d at 759. The court gave several rea-
sons why the rules of offer and acceptance did not apply:
(1) there was no evidence that the general contractor's use of the bid was
an acceptance binding him to the contract with the subcontractor if he
were awarded the prime contract;
(2) there was no option supported by consideration; and
(3) there was no bilateral contract binding both parties.
Id.
100. Id. at -, 333 P.2d at 760.
101. The court held that "[t]he very purpose of section 90 is to make a prom-
ise binding even though there was no consideration 'in the sense of something
that is bargained for and given in exchange.' (See 1 Corbin, Contracts 634 et seq.
[sic]) Reasonable reliance serves to hold the offeror in lieu of the consideration
ordinarily required to make the offer binding." 51 Cal. 2d at 414, 333 P.2d at 760.
[Vol. 10:293
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could expect the general contractor to use the low bid and that this
expectation justified the implication of a promise by the subcon-
tractor.10 2 This implication, subsidiary to his sub-bid offer, was not
to revoke the offer until the general contractor had been allowed a
"reasonable time" to accept. 0 3 The court also held that the general
contractor's reasonable reliance resulting in foreseeable prejudicial
change in position afforded a strong basis for implying a subsidiary
promise not to revoke."" Consequently, the Drennan court held
for the plaintiff general contractor. The Drennan decision, though
not directly on point, is in line with the North Carolina Supreme
Court's Wachovia decision. The Wachovia court held, inter alia,
that implied promises followed by detrimental reliance can result
in recovery. 5
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Home Electric Co.
also denied the plaintiff's promissory estoppel cause of action be-
cause of the potential injustice in construction bidding if a court
allows the plaintiff to recover. 06 However, this potential injustice
is not a necessary result. Even though the Drennan decision is fol-
lowed by the majority of jurisdictions hearing construction bidding
cases, it left many unanswered questions in light of the possible
misdeeds by the general contractor.
102. Id.
103. Id. (discussing "subsidiary promise").
104. The court stated:
When plaintiff used defendant's offer in computing his own bid, he
bound himself to perform in reliance on the defendant's terms. Though
defendant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did defendant
make it idly, indifferent to whether it would be used or not. On the con-
trary it is reasonable to suppose that defendant submitted its bid to ob-
tain the subcontract. It was bound to realize the substantial possibility
that its bid would be the lowest, and that it would be included by plain-
tiff in his bid. It was to its own interest that the contractor be awarded
the general contract; the lower the subcontract bid, thi lower the general
contractor's bid was likely to be and the greater its chance of acceptance
and hence the greater defendant's chance of getting the paving subcon-
tract. Defendant had reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid
but to want him to. Clearly defendant had a stake in plaintiff's reliance
on its bid. Given this interest and the fact that plaintiff is bound by his
own bid, it is only fair that plaintiff should have at least an opportunity
to accept defendant's bid after the general contract has been awarded to
him.
51 Cal. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760.
105. 306 N.C. at 431, 293 S.E.2d at 758.
106. 86 N.C. App. at 545, 358 S.E.2d at 542.
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The circuit court in N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman clarified
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applied in construction bid-
ding cases.'017 That court held that, before a subcontractor can be
liable to the general contractor under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, four conditions must be met. First, the subcontractor
must have promised affirmatively to do something. 108 Second, the
subcontractor could have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of reli-
ance by the general contractor. 10 9 Third, the general contractor
must have relied justifiably on the subcontractor's offer." 0 Fourth,
the general contractor must have experienced substantial detri-
ment as a result of his justifiable reliance.'
These four conditions are, in essence, the elements contained
in section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. This
section has provided an impetus for allowing promissory estoppel
to be used in construction bidding cases in the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have heard this type of case. Section 87(2) states:
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce re-
liance or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the
offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent
necesssary to avoid injustice." 2
The Home Electric Co. court disregarded the plaintiff's reli-
ance on this crucial Restatement section. If the court had recog-
nized section 87(2) as applying promissory estoppel to construction
bidding cases, then it could have remanded the case for trial to
determine several factors. The trial court or jury could determine
the subcontractor's foreseeability of reliance by ascertaining
whether, under local custom, subcontractors themselves expect the
general contractors to rely on their sub-bids and whether they ex-
pect to be bound by their sub-bids." 3 The factfinder, in determin-
ing justifiable reliance, could stress the fact that the general con-
tractor was required to submit a bid bond forfeitable in the event
107. 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
108. Id. at 738-40.
109. Id. at 739.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 739.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1979).
113. The N. Litterio court looked to this factor to determine the subcontrac-
tor's foreseeability regarding the likelihood of the general contractor's reliance.
306 [Vol. 10:293
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that he was awarded the prime contract and failed to perform. 14
Finally, since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable
remedy recognized in contract law, the court or jury could deny
recovery if the equities lie against the plaintiff contractor.115
Even though the Home Electric Co. court feared the potential
for injustice if it allowed a promissory estoppel cause of action for
the general contractor, it should not have barred such a cause of
action. Promissory estoppel has tended to increase the ability of
the general contractor to engage in post-award negotiations." 6
However, the courts can protect the subcontractor by refusing to
apply promissory estoppel whenever conclusive evidence estab-
lishes that the general contractor tried to have the subcontractor
cut his price, the general contractor shopped for a lower price, or
the general contractor actively negotiated for a better contract. '
The subcontractors are protected, albeit indirectly, by the fact
that a general contractor's justifiable reliance is difficult to prove.
This justifiable reliance must be established by business custom in
the particular locality and by testimony concerning the practices
that a general contractor is required to know about his trade.1 8
Courts have also refused to apply the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel in cases where the equities lie with the subcontractor. For ex-
ample, if the subcontractor's bid was so "glaringly low" as to put
the general contractor on notice that a mistake had been made,
then the general contractor has no case. 1 9
Another form of protection for the subcontractor is applica-
tion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the general con-
tractor. 12 ° As one author commented:
In order for promissory estoppel to be applicable, all the require-
ments of section 90 must be met. Thus, there must be a promise
that was relied upon . . . [There must be the finding] of an im-
plied promise to award the contract to the subcontractor whose
bid was used in preparing the estimate [if known] which won the
prime contract .... Such a promise should be implied in many
114. This is another factor the N. Litterio court looked at in determining
"justifiable reliance" by the general contractor.
115. See Note, supra note 81, at 387.
116. See Comment, supra note 83, at 565.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 565-66.
119. See Note, supra note 81, at 394.
120. See Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontract Con-
struction Industry, 18 UCLA L. REV. 389, 406 (1971).
1988]
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cases-to paraphrase Drennan-to preclude the injustice that
would result if the general contractor could use the bid of the
subcontractor in winning the prime contract and then permitted
to shop for lower sub-bids. Once that promise has been implied,
the issue would then be whether or not the promisor (general)
should reasonably expect its implied promise to induce reliance
on the part of the promisee (subcontractor). This would be a fac-
tual determination depending upon the circumstances of the par-
ticular case and the common practices within the trade.12
The Home Electric court's fear of potential injustice in con-
struction bidding is unfounded in light of the above analysis. In
reality, the general contractor may choose to perform a misdeed
because the subcontractor is bound and he is not. However, com-
mon practice shows this is the exception and not the rule. 22
Therefore, the majority of jurisdictions rightfully afford the gen-
eral contractor the benefit of the doubt. If the equities do not lie
with the general contractor, the court should rule accordingly.
CONCLUSION
In its review of the Home Electric Co. case, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court should equate North Carolina's doctrine of
promissory estoppel with sections 90 and 87(2) of the Restatement
for the following reasons. First, section 90 allows the affirmative
use of promissory estoppel. Recovery is limited as justice re-
quires."' Second, section 87(2) adds support to applying promis-
sory estoppel to construction bidding cases. 2 Third, the Wachovia
court applied the elements of section 90 and the case is well known
as a."promissory estoppel" case, as opposed to a "waiver by estop-
pel" case (which it really is).125 Fourth, the Lee court, quoting
Clement, found that the current state of the law allows a promisee
to use promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration. 26
Fifth, the Campbell court interpreted Wachovia to mean that
promissory estoppel, as described in section 90, applied in North
Carolina. 2 7 Finally, the majority of jurisdictions not only allow the
promissory estoppel causes of action in general, they allow them in
121. Id.
122. See Schultz, supra note 83, at 237.
123. See Note, supra note 81.
124. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
125. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749.
126. 78 N.C. App. at 340, 337 S.E.2d at 136.
127. 708 F.2d at 933-34.
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construction bidding situations based upon Drennan and section
87(2).128
The message to the North Carolina Supreme Court is loud and
clear. The court should consider the reasons set forth for allowing
the use of promissory estoppel as described in sections 90 and
87(2) of the Restatement and afford the plaintiff in Home Electric
Co. the opportunity to attempt to prove its case.
Lu Ann Brown
128. See supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
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